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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

RICHARD E. LOWE and
BEVERLY LOWE
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.

Case No. 940388-CA

KYLE C. GOLIGHTLY and
KYLE C. GOLIGHTLY dba
KYLE C. GOLIGHTLY CONSTRUCTION,

Priority No. 2

Defendants and Appellees.

The

Appellants

submit

the

following

Reply

Brief

in

accordance with the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Appellees do not dispute that the trial court failed to
consider and properly decide the issues relating to the contracts
signed by the parties.

The trial court failed to decide whether

the contracts were integrated and ambiguous before allowing the
introduction of extrinsic
their dealings.
regard

evidence

from the parties

regarding

Because the trial court made no rulings with

to the contracts, it is impossible

to determine what

evidence was properly considered by the trial court in deciding
the merits of the case.

The inadequacy of the findings makes it

impossible to determine what rulings the trial court made with
regard to the contract and whether those rulings are supportable.
The documents introduced
contracts

signed

unambiguous.

by

the

The trial

in this case establish that the

parties
court

were

should

fully
have

integrated

declined

to

and
admit

evidence that alter or modify the terms of those agreements.
The Findings of Fact are not supported by
evidence.

admissible

The evidence supporting the Findings was inadmissible

in that it attempted to modify the terms of a fully integrated
contract.

Additionally, the Findings are not

sufficiently

detailed to allow a proper review and are skewed by the trial
court's use of an erroneous view of the law.
ARGUMENT
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO MAKE ADEQUATE FINDINGS
OF FACT WITH REGARD TO THE ISSUES IN THIS CASE.
In Point I of the Appellants' original brief, the Appellants
contend that the trial court failed to make adequate findings of
fact with regard to issues in the case.

The Appellants relied

upon the clear language of Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure which requires a trial court, adjudicating

a case

without a jury, to "find the facts specially and state separately
its conclusions of law thereon . . . ."
As noted in the original brief, the Utah Appellate Court has
required that the findings be sufficiently detailed to allow the
reviewing court the information necessary to review the trial
court's decision.

State v. James, 858 P.2d 1012, 1015 (Utah

1993).
The Appellant further contends that in a case involving
issues based on contract, the trial court must determine if the
contract is integrated

and unambiguous before allowing the

introduction of parole evidence.

The clear mandate in that

regard was provided by the Court in Valley Bank v. Cottonwood
2

Wood & Loan Indus., 798 P.2d 749, 753 (Utah 1990):
Whether a contact is ambiguous is a question of law
. . . Moreover, the trial court must determine
"whether a contract is ambiguous . . • before it takes
any evidence in clarification."

It follows, therefore,

that if the contract is clear on its face, the trial
court need not —

and in fact should not -- consider

evidence of a contrary meaning.
See also,

(Emphasis added.)

Morris v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 658 P.2d

1199, 1200 (Utah 1983).
It is interesting to note that Point I of the Appellees1
brief is entitled "Plaintiff Appellant (sic) Misconstrues the
Parol Evidence Rule."

However, after setting out two quotations

from a secondary source, the Appellees failed to relate the
argument either to the Appellants1 brief or to the facts of this
case (Appellees' brief at 10).

Because the Appellees have failed

to relate Point I of their brief either to the Appellants1
argument or the facts, this Court should strike that portion of
the Appellees' brief.

This Court has held that it will not

address issues for which there is no argument or analysis.
D.D.Z. v. Molerway Freight Lines, 880 P. 2d 1 (Utah Ct. App.
1994); State v. Jennings, 875 P.2d 566 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
In Point II of Appellees' brief, the respondents argue that
the trial court properly allowed the introduction of parol
evidence to determine whether there was an integrated agreement
(Appellees' brief at 10-16).

In support of the proposition,
3

Appellees cite Corbin on Contracts, 582 p. 444-447 (Appellees'
brief at 10-11).

However, even the authorities cited by the

Appellees require the trial court, after hearing the relevant
evidence, to determine
unambiguous
admitted.

if the contract

and therefore whether parol

is integrated

and

evidence will be

Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 663 (Utah 1985).

As clearly indicated by the Court in Eie v. St. Benedict's
Hospital, 638 P.2d 1190, 1194 (Utah 1981):
The trial court must first determine if the contract
is integrated, i.e., an agreement "where the parties
thereto adopt a writing or writings as the final and
complete expression of the agreement.

An integration

is the writing or writings so adopted."
Unless the trial court determines that the contract is not
integrated or that it is ambiguous,
. . . The parol evidence rule excludes evidence of
terms in addition to those in the agreement,

thus

excluding "contemporaneous conversations, statements,
or representations offered for the purpose of varying
or adding to the terms of an integrated contract . . .
There is a rebuttable presumption

that a written

contract which appears to complete and certain is
integrated . . . Courts are not obligated to rewrite
contracts entered into by the parties dealing at arms*
length, to relieve one party from a bargain later
regretted, simply on supposed equitable principles."

Webb v, R.O.A. General, Inc., 804 P.2d 547, 551 (Utah App. 1991);
Colonial Leasing Co., v. Larsen Bros. Const., 731 P.2d 483, 486
(Utah 1986); Hal Taylor Assocs., v. Unionamerican, Inc., 657 P.2d
743, 749 (Utah 1982).
There is no question that the Appellees have conceded that
the trial court is required to make definitive findings of fact
with

sufficient

detail

so

that

conclusion can be understood.

the

basis

of

the

ultimate

Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance

Co., 776 P.2d 896 (Utah 1989).

As noted by the Court in Jensen

v. Jensen, 775 P.2d 436 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), adequate findings
are those that (1) are sufficiently detailed, (2) include enough
facts

to

disclose

the

conclusion is reached,

process

through

which

the

(3) indicate the processes

ultimate

logical

and

properly supported, and (4) are not clearly erroneous.
Having determined the obligation of the trial court to make
definitive

findings, the Appellees

argue only that the trial

court may hear parol evidence in order to make a determination of
whether or not the contract is integrated and unambiguous.

The

Appellees do not cite any authority or even contend that the
trial court, in a contract case, can avoid the determination of
whether or not the contract is integrated

(Appellees' brief at

10-16).
Having determined that the trial court had an obligation to
make specific findings regarding the nature of the contract and
the admissability of parol evidence, the Appellants argue that
the trial court failed to make the necessary findings regarding
5

the integration of the contract and the admissability of parol
The Appellees1 brief is entirely

evidence to modify the same.
silent on that issue.

Appellees do not contend that the trial

court made the necessary findings.
It is clear that the failure of the trial court to make
findings on all material issues is reversible error.
Epstein, 741 P.2d

974 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).

Epstein v.

As noted by the

Court in Parks v. Zions First National Bank, 673 P.2d 590 (Utah
1983),

the

findings must

clearly

indicate

the

"mind

of

the

court", and the failure to enter adequate findings requires the
judgment be vacated.
The facts indicate that the parties signed two agreements.
The first, designated as a Sales Agreement is dated September 9,
1988 and contains the following important language:
...
and

2.

The contractor has inspected the site . . .

has accepted the site in its present condition for

work he is to do under this contract.
3.

The

contractor

residence
furnish

all

construction

and

agrees

to

improvements

labor

and

and the

construction
and

materials

to

of

said

provide

and

required

completion thereof

for

such

strictly

in

accordance with the plans and specifications approved
and signed by the owner and contractor and made a part
of this Agreement, and in accordance with

applicable

laws and ordinances affecting such construction.

The

work to be done by the contractor shall include, but

6

shall not be limited to, all excavating, sheetrock,
tile and/or linoleum work, iron work, sheet metal work,
glass, painting, plumbing, heating, electrical work,
cash allowances, etc. all complete as specified in the
plans and specifications.
4.

The owner, for and in consideration of the full,

complete and faithful performance of this Agreement by
the contractor and his payment of all bills incurred in
the construction, agrees to pay or cause to be paid to
the contractor

the sum of One Hundred

Seventeen

Thousand One Hundred Dollars ($117,100.00). of which
amount ($117,100.00) Dollars, consisting of a loan with
American

Savings

and Loan Association,

and

sash

deposited by the owner, shall be placed with said
lender for disbursement as the work progresses.
5.

No changes in the plans or specifications shall be

make by the contractor without the written order of the
owner and approval of the American Savings and Loan
Association.

The amount to be paid by the owner or

allowed by the contractor by virtue of such extras or
changes, as agreed by the owner and contractor shall
be stated in such order, and payment shall be make to
the contractor at the time said extra work or change is
authorized.
Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 5.
The second Agreement, designated
7

as the Building

Loan

Agreement and Assignment of Account, dated September 21, 1988,
required the completion of the home within six months from the
date of the Agreement, and required appropriate draw requests.
Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 9, Addendum No. 2.
The Appellees do not take issue with the Appellants'
contention that the trial court did not make any appropriate
rulings regarding the integration of the contracts or provide a
factual basis for the admissibility of extrinsic evidence to vary
the terms of the written agreement.

The only reference to the

contracts in the Memorandum Decision are as follows:
. . . 4.

There were many changes made in accordance

with the contract in writing, many others appeared to
be verbal in nature but agreed to by both parties as to
what those changes are, the evidence is contradictory
. . .

As to plaintiffs' allegation of failing to construct
the residence in accordance with the plans and
specifications, there is no question but what he did
not, but the plans and specifications were changed many
times both in writing and verbally and orally by the
plaintiffs and many times through the plaintiffs' son
Clay

who

was

the

construction company

foreman

for

the

defendants'

....

R. 355-360, Addendum No. 5, Findings of Fact Nos. 11 and 15, R.
428-443, Addendum No. 6.
The intent of the trial court is unclear from its rulings.
8

The Findings of Fact incorporate the language from the Memorandum
Decision that there was significant disagreement between the
parties (R. 440). However, as with the Memorandum Decision, the
findings fail to explain the court's repudiation of the clear and
unambiguous contract signed by the parties.
It well may be that the trial court simply failed to
consider the legal issue regarding integration, ambiguity and the
admissability of parol evidence.

Judge Christofferson is a

retired senior judge.

The trial was held on August 24 through

26, 1992 (R. 178-183).

The court's Memorandum Decision was not

signed by Judge Christofferson until June 1, 1993, nearly nine
months later (R. 354-360).
It is unclear whether the trial judge made a legal error
with regard to the applicable law.

The record simply does not

disclose whether Judge Christofferson appreciated the fact that
parol evidence could not be used to modify the terms of an
integrated contract and that explicit rulings were necessary in
that regard.
The actual language contained in the Memorandum Decision is
not very helpful.

The court found that there were changes made

in accordance with the contract but also found that there were
"many others appeared to be verbal in nature but agreed to by
both parties as to what those changes are, the evidence is
contradictory."
428-443).

(R. 335-360, Findings of Fact Nos. 11 and 15, R.

It is not clear from that language whether the court

found the written contracts to be integrated or not.
9

Although

the court refers to verbal changes, the court failed to find any
verbal contracts.

Instead, the court found that the evidence was

contradictory as to the verbal changes.
The

Appellants

recognize

that

the

trial

court's

interpretation of the words of the parties' contract is reviewed
by the Appellate Court as a question of law under a correctness
standard.

Likewise if the trial court makes factual

findings

about the intent of the parties based on extrinsic evidence, the
appellate court's review is strictly limited.
River Group, 748 P. 2d 1102

Hansen v. Green

(Utah Ct. App. 1988);

Zions First

National Bank v. National American Title Insurance, 749 P.2d 651
(Utah 1988).

In this case, the trial court did not make any

rulings, as a matter of law, on the contract of the parties and
certainly did not make any factual findings regarding ambiguity,
the intent of the parties or the existence of subsequent oral
contracts.

Accordingly, the only alternative is to vacate the

judgment in order to allow specific factual findings upon which
legal conclusions can be made.
POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY ALLOWED THE INTRODUCTION
OF EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE TO MODIFY THE TERMS OF THE WRITTEN
AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE PARTIES.
A.

The Contracts Executed by the Parties are Integrated and

Unambiguous.
The Appellants
parties

constituted

contend
an

that the documents

integrated

and

signed

unambiguous

by the

contract.

There is a rebuttable presumption that a written contract which
appears to be complete and certain is integrated.

10

Eie v. St.

Benedictf s Hospital, supra; Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz,
supra; Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985).
The Appellees contend that inasmuch as the Appellants must
point to more than one document, there can be no integration
(Appellees' brief at 10-12).
facts.

The argument misconstrues the

The first agreement executed by the parties was a Sales

Agreement dated September 9, 1988.

The second agreement was

executed because of the involvement of a lending institution.

It

was designated as a Building Loan Agreement and Assignment of
Account, dated September 21, 1988.

There is nothing unusual in

having an agreement between an owner of property and a builder
and then a separate agreement relating to the loan funds to build
the home.

There is nothing that is inconsistent or contradictory

in the two agreements.

The Sales Agreement clearly outlined the

responsibilities of the builder and the method by which changes
to the contract could be made:
• . . 2.
and

The contractor has inspected the site . . .

has accepted the site in its present condition for

work he is to do under this contract.
3.

The contractor agrees to construction of said

residence and improvements and to provide and
furnish all labor and materials required for such
construction and the completion thereof strictly in
accordance with the plans and specifications approved
and signed by the owner and contractor and made a part
of this Agreement, and in accordance with applicable
11

laws and ordinances affecting such construction.

The

work to be done by the contractor shall include, but
shall

not be limited

to, all excavating,

sheetrock,

tile and/or linoleum work, iron work, sheet metal work,
glass,

painting, plumbing, heating, electrical

work,

cash allowances, etc. all complete as specified in the
plans and specifications.
4.

The owner, for and in consideration of the full,

complete and faithful performance of this Agreement by
the contractor and his payment of all bills incurred in
the construction, agrees to pay or cause to be paid to
the

contractor

the

sum

of

Thousand One Hundred Dollars

One

Hundred

Seventeen

($117,100.00). of which

amount ($117,100.00) Dollars, consisting of a loan with
American

Savings

deposited

by

and

Loan

the owner,

Association,

shall

be

placed

and

sash

with

said

lender for disbursement as the work progresses.
5.

No changes in the plans or specifications shall be

make by the contractor without the written order of the
owner and approval of the American Savings and Loan
Association.

The amount to be paid by the owner or

allowed by the contractor by virtue of such extras or
changes, as agreed by the owner and contractor shall
be stated in such order, and payment shall be made to
the contractor at the time said extra work or change is
authorized.
12

Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 5.
Appellees do not contend that there is anything about the
agreements that is ambiguous.

Instead, the Appellees argue that

"it is clear that there were other matters which the parties
agreed on that were not included in any written documents however
none

the

less were

(Appellees' brief

a part of the agreement by the parties."

at

13).

To substantiate

Appellees point to only one example.
was

the

intent

of

the

parties

their claim, the

They cite the fact that it

that

the

home

be

heated

by

hydronics yet the hydronic heating system was not included on the
plans.
The

Appellees

have

testimony in the case.

failed

to

review

the

documents

and

The heating of the home and specifically,

the installation of hydronic heat was a task to be performed by
the

Lowes, the

Appellants

herein.

The

Sales

Agreement

of

September 9, 1988 requires the contractor to perform the work
related
masonry,
pile

to

"all

excavating,

rough

grating,

lumbar, carpentry, interior trim,

and/or

linoleum

work,

iron

work,

concrete

work,

labor, sheet rock,
sheet

metal

work."

(Plaintiffs1 Exhibit No. 5 ) . The contract explicitly omitted any
responsibility by the contractor for the heating.
The Plaintiff Mrs. Lowe testified that the installation of
the

hydronic

installation

heat
of

was

the

project (T. at 47-49).

their

hydronic

responsibility
heat

caused

no

and

that

delays

on

the
the

The Plaintiff, Mr. Lowe testified that

the heating was the responsibility

13

of the Plaintiffs

and any

excess over the budgeted amount would be their responsibility (T.
at 109-110).
the plans
Steven

Gilbert Hayes, contractor and the person drawing

for the home, testified

Anderson,

a brother

to

likewise

the

(T. at

Plaintiff

268-269).

Beverly

Lowe,

testified that he installed the hydronic system for the Lowes and
that the job was completed without any major hold-ups (T. at 337344).

Even the Defendant, Kyle Golightly, testified that the

heating was the responsibility of the Lowes (T. at 503-505).
In summary, the responsibility for the installation of the
hydronic

heat was

plumbing

was

that of

the Plaintiffs.

contractually

delegated

to

the

The heating

and

Plaintiffs

and

omitted from the duties and tasks of the contractor.
Mr.

Golightly,

one

of

the

Appellees,

Although

contends

that

the

installation of the hydronic heat caused some delay on the job,
there was no issue raised by the parties that the responsibility
for the heating and plumbing was omitted from the contracts were
the subject to the subsequent oral agreement.
example

alluded

to

by

the

Appellees

to

Thus, the only

establish

the non-

integration of the contract has no merit.
It should also be noted that the Appellees argue that the
parol

evidence

rule

allows

the

introduction

of

any

oral

or

written agreements entered into between the parties subsequent to
the original contract

(Appellees' brief at 15).

Although the

parol evidence rule may allow the introduction of subsequent oral
or written agreements, that is not the issue in this case.
detailed

in the Appellants 1

original
14

Statement of

As

Facts, the

contract signed by the parties specifically restricted any
changes in the plans or specifications for the building of the
house in question, to be in writing, signed by the owners.
Appellees failed to cite any evidence where in the parties voided
or negated that portion of the Sales Agreement of September 9,
1988.
B.

Improper Extrinsic Evidence was Received by the Trial

Court.
The Appellees contend in Point III of their brief that the
parties agreed to the changes of the plans and specifications
during construction that substituted a subsequent contract for
that of the original Sales Agreement (Appellees' brief at 16).
The Appellees continue by stating:
There were several incidences at trial where both the
Plaintiff and the Defendant agreed and the court so
found where changes were made to the plains and
specifications that were incorporated into the original
contract.

(See paragraph 11 of the Statement of

Facts. )
Appellees' brief at 16.
A quick review of paragraph 11 of the Appellees' Statement
of Facts does not refer to "several incidences" of subsequent
agreement between the parties that is inconsistent with the
original agreement.

Instead, paragraph 11 of the Appellees'

Statement of Facts is simply a verbatim recitation of Beverly
Lowe's testimony that she would make comments to the contractor
15

regarding

aesthetics.

There

is no

citation

to

the

record

revealing any agreements, increased costs or formal changes.
The

record

change orders.

reveals

that

the Plaintiffs

signed only

four

The first was on November 9, 1988 for $747.55

requiring an extension of the gas line, a galvanized window well
and the cost of additional foundation.

The second change order

is dated October 19, 1988 for $160.00 to complete a lot survey
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 14).

Those changes were paid by check

dated november 15, 1988 in the amount of $907.55 (T. 92, line 1
to 93, Line 24).

The third change order was dated December 3,

1988 in the amount of $960.00 for the removal of trash.

The last

change order was dated March 5, 1989 in the amount of $1,977.50
for additional concrete work (Plaintiffs1 Exhibit No. 14).
The

evidence

also

establishes

that

the

Plaintiffs

did

request a loft in the south end of the home, a two step rise in
the family room, a drop ceiling in the front room, and an outlet
in

the

dining

inconsequential

room.

All

of

the

minor

changes

were

and in keeping with the design contemplated by

the plans (T. 60, Line 7 to 64, Line 7; 86, Lines 1 to 20; 87,
Line 21 to 89, Line 18).
overages

for expenses

The Plaintiffs agreed to pay for all

incurred

in extras

involving

cabinets,

vanities and floor coverings (T. 86, Line 17 to 87, Line 20).
In sum, the Appellees have failed to establish any ambiguity
in the original contract or evidence that the contract did not
embody the final intent of the Plaintiffs and Defendants with
regard

to the construction of the home.
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Although

there were

inconsequential changes to the plans, the major changes were
incorporated into change orders as required by the contract
(Appellees' brief at 5-7, 15-16).
With a clear background on the evidence in the case, there
is simply no basis to support the trial court's ruling as to the
admissibility of key testimony.

As outlined in the original

Appellants' brief, the Defendants were allowed

to testify

regarding changes that were not memorialized by the written
approvals of the Plaintiffs or the bank (T. 503-504).
Even though the Defendants accepted

the site for the

construction of the home and although the contract required them
to assume responsibility for all excavating, the Defendants were
allowed

to

testify

responsibility
Although

regarding

the

Plaintiffs

for ditch and canal problems

there were only

four signed

change

alleged

(T. 507-509).
orders, the

Defendants were allowed to testify to over fifty-six changes to
the contract that were not memorialized to signed change orders.
Other examples of the improper parol evidence are contained in
Point II of the Appellants' original brief.
One other point should be made.

The Appellants had a right

to insist in certain change orders.

There is no evidence that

the Appellants waived their right to have all changes reduced to
writing and signed.

As noted by the Court in Soter's Inc. v.

Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Assoc, 857 P.2d 935 (Utah 1993):
Waiver requires three elements:

(1) an existing right,

benefit, or advantage; (2) knowledge of its existence;
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and, (3) an intention to relinquish the right.
There

is

simply

no evidence

that would

support

a waiver

or

modification of the requirement for written change orders.
POINT III: THE FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND JUDGMENT ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT ADMISSIBLE
EVIDENCE AND ARE THEREFORE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.
A.

The Legal Tests for Challenging the Sufficiency of the

Trial Court's Findings.
The

Appellee

agrees

with

the

test

outlined

Appellants' brief (Appellees' brief at 17).
that a trial court's actual

in

the

It should be noted

finding is erroneous if there is

insufficient evidence to support the finding or if the findings
are not articulated with sufficient detail so that the basis of
the ultimate conclusion can be understood.

Reid v. Mutual of

Omaha Insurance Co., 776 P.2d 896 (Utah 1989).

The evidence that

must

be

support

a trial

court's

competent and admissible.

finding

must

substantial,

Brigham City v. Mantua Town, 754 P.2d

1230 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

Additionally, Findings of Fact are

clearly erroneous if it can be shown that they are induced by an
erroneous view of the law.

Interiors Contracting v. Smith, 881

P.2d 929 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
B.

The

Findings

Contained

in

the

Court's

Memorandum

Decision are not Supported by Admissible Evidence and are
Clearly Erroneous.
In Findings numbered 3 and 4, the court referred

to the

significant disagreement and contradiction in the testimony of
the parties and witnesses (R. 440). The Appellees cite testimony
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from the Plaintiffs relating to the areas of construction over
which they were to maintain control.

Although there is some

difference between the testimony, it was consistent with the
terms of the original Sales Contract executed by the parties. As
noted in the Appellants' original brief, most of the testimony
that was contradictory

and inconsistent was testimony that

intended to vary the terms of the unambiguous and integrated
agreements signed by the parties.

If the trial court had

properly excluded the inadmissable parol evidence, much of the
contradictory testimony would have been eliminated.

The finding

of the court is based therefore on an erroneous view of the law.
The Appellants' position is bolstered by the Appellees' argument
regarding the Extension Agreement.

The parties executed an

Extension Agreement on March 22, 1989.

The clear language of the

agreement allowed additional time, to June 20, 1989 for the
payment of the construction loan.

The document neither dealt

with nor extended the time for the home to be constructed
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 21; T. 189 to 192; Appellees' brief at
19-20).

The trial court's allowance of parol evidence to

interpret and modify an unambiguous contract is clear error.
Findings

5 and

Plaintiffs' son, Clay.

6 dealt with the

involvement

of

the

The trial court found that because Clay

assumed a leading and responsible role, he was an agent for the
Defendants as well as the Plaintiffs.

The court found that

changes in the construction based upon conversations between Clay
and the Plaintiffs (R. 439-440).
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The erroneous assumption made

by the trial court is that the parties should be relieved of the
clear contractual obligation to have all change orders in writing
and signed by the respective parties.

Findings 5 and 6 are a

classic example of the trial court allowing parol evidence to
alter the terms of the contract without ever finding that the
contract was not integrated or was not ambiguous.

After all, the

reason for the requirement of written change orders is to prevent
subsequent bickering over the transaction.

Further, as noted in

the original brief, the Defendant Golightly never claimed that
Clay exceeded his authority or acted outside the course and scope
of his employment.

Additionally, the Defendants made no claim

for contribution or indemnification

against Clay.

If the

Defendants contended that Clay acted improperly, their remedy was
to preserve that issue into pleadings.
Finding number 7 relates to changes that were not reflected
on the plans (R. 439).

As detailed herein, there were four

written change orders and some inconsequential changes. However,
the issue of what oral changes were accepted by the parties is
once again complicated by the trial court's failure to make
rulings with regard to the admissibility of parol evidence.
Finding number 8 relates to the areas over which the
respective parties may maintain control (R. 438-439).

Finding

number 8 is another example of the significance of the trial
court's failure to rule on parol evidence.

The Sales Agreement

clearly recited the areas over which the Defendants would be
responsible and the areas over which the Plaintiffs would retain
20

control.

Despite the explicit categorization of responsibility,

the court allowed the Defendants to testify to a delegation of
responsibilities contrary to the terms of the written contract.
Findings 9 and 10 relate to delay on the project that are so
distorted

because of the breadth the witnesses were given to

testify as to have no real impact on the conclusions in this case
(R. 430-438).
Finding number 11 causes the same problems as recited above.
Finding 11 states as follows:
There were many changes made in accordance with the
contract in writing while many other changes were
made as a result of verbal requests and agreed to by
both parties as to what the changes would be.

These

changes also caused delay to the job.
The Finding

is not specific enough to detail the changes the

court was referring to in order to allow the litigants or this
Court to comment.
those

Obviously, if the verbal requests were simply

inconsequential

significance.

changes referred

However,

if

the

to above, there

court

is

attributing

is no
major

alterations of the contract to verbal changes, an analysis would
have to be made.

Because

the

Finding

is neither

clear nor

sufficiently detailed, no substantive response could be made.
In

Finding

number

12, the

trial

court

found

that

the

Extension Agreement was intended to extend the time in which the
Defendants had to complete the construction of the home.
the

court

allowed

extrinsic

evidence
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to vary

the

Again,

clear

and

unambiguous terms of the Extension Agreement without making any
finding as to ambiguity or non-integration•
Critically, in Findings numbered

13, 14 and 15 the court

found that the Defendants failed to construct the residence in
accordance with the original plans and specifications
437).

(R. 435-

In essence, the court found that the Defendant had failed

to comply with the terms of the contract but refused to grant the
Plaintiffs any relief based upon the existence of modifications
to the contract.
seen.

The error of the trial court can clearly be

The trial court failed to find the original

agreements

ambiguous but still allowed oral testimony to vary the terms of
the same.

The court, without specifying what oral

agreements

were being found by the court to exist, took away all relief from
the Plaintiffs.
The Findings of the trial court are clearly erroneous both
because there is an inadequate factual basis and because they are
skewed by an erroneous view of the law.
CONCLUSION
The trial court failed to comply with the requirements of
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Findings

made by the court were not sufficiently detailed to provide the
litigants

or

this

Court with

an understanding

court's methodology.

The trial

findings

the

relative

to

court

integration

contract signed by the parties.

simply
and

of

the

failed

ambiguity

trial

to make
of

the

Additionally, the court made no

explicit rulings on the Parol Evidence Rule as applied to the
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facts of this case.
The contracts signed by the parties were integrated and
unambiguous.

The contracts clearly required all changes to the

plans and specifications to be in writing and signed by the
parties.

The contravention of the clear language of the

contracts, the trial court improperly allowed extrinsic evidence
to alter and modify the terms of the original contract.
The Findings of Fact in this case are clearly erroneous both
because there is an inadequate evidentiary basis to support the
same and because the Findings are based upon an erroneous view
of the law.

The evidence that does support the Findings is

evidence that should have been ruled inadmissible.
The Appellants

are entitled

to an Order vacation the

judgment in this case and for entry of a Judgment consistent with
the law.
DATED this

day of January, 1995.

Michael J. Petro, Esq.
Attorney for Appellants
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